

16 SEP 1988

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

NIC #03070-88

National Intelligence Council

Memo to DDI

Dick:

*I think Budge, Gershwin,
MacEachin, Castillo, and*

*[redacted] might to meet and STAT
thrash out their views, coming
back to you and me with
one view or a range of options.
Otherwise we can meet all together
as a group of 7. But I think
that's a bit much.*

Paul

cc: NIO/GPF
NIO/SP

VE/HIC
C/HIC

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	NIO/GPF		X		
18	SA/DCI/INF		X		
19	C/ACIS/DI		X		
20	D/SOVA/DI		X		
21	NIO/SP				
22					
		SUSPENSE _____ Date			

Remarks

NIC 03037-88

3637 (10-81)

01 Executive Secretary

15 SEP 88

Date

STAT

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC# 03037-88
8 September 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: MG Larry D. Budge, USA
National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces
SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to Conventional Arms Control
Negotiations

1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to provide you some thoughts on intelligence support to the upcoming conventional arms control negotiations.

2. As you are aware, NATO is very close to agreement with the Warsaw Pact on a mandate for Conventional Stability Talks. These talks could begin later this fall or, more likely, in the spring following the transition to a new US administration. Intelligence support to conventional arms control negotiations, however, remains fragmented. SOVA currently represents the Intelligence Community at the Conventional Arms Control IG and the Senior Arms Control Group as an extension of its earlier role in providing support for the MBFR negotiations. DIA supports DoD and the JCS, while the service intelligence organizations support their respective services. Of interest, several weeks ago the NIO/GPF hosted a Military Analytic Exchange on the subject of Conventional Arms Control and we found that while there is significant arms control related intelligence activity going on in the Community, there is no Community structure for coordinating this activity and providing it to the arms control policymakers. This observation is not meant to denigrate SOVA's work in this area where Tom Troy has done an outstanding job. We are at the point now, however, where we need to provide a single Community voice. The DCI and the NFIB need to become real players in the conventional arms control process.


3. The Conventional Stability Talks promise to be more complex than either the START or the INF negotiations. The negotiations will be multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral, requiring in-depth political and military intelligence on both our Allies and the Warsaw Pact. Development of military judgments of conventional capabilities will be more complex than

Larry - I agree that present arrangements will not be adequate in the future. Any new support organization must have a community flavor. I have asked Dick Kerr to consider some options. I think Castillo, Doug MacEachron, and you should sit down and develop some concrete options for my consideration. Reg.

for strategic weapons. Rather than simple "bean counting," the depth of analysis required will approach that required for net assessments. Intelligence judgments on military capabilities will play a role in determining which forces are negotiated away and which are kept. Consequently, there may be a temptation by some to structure intelligence judgments to favor certain future US force structures. Finally, development of a verification regime for a conventional arms control agreement promises to be particularly difficult, given the amount of equipment involved, the ease with which much of it can be concealed, and the demands which START and INF will already be making on our national technical means and our limited number of qualified inspectors.

4. The DCI should develop an organization as soon as possible which will provide coordinated Intelligence Community support to the conventional arms control policymakers and the US delegation to the Conventional Stability Talks. The composition of this organization should represent all of the Intelligence Community and be perceived by everyone as the conventional arms control spokesman for the DCI and the NFIB. Because of the heavy military involvement in conventional arms control, the chief of the organization should be a general officer and a senior CIA officer should serve as the deputy. DIA, NSA, INR, and the service intelligence organizations must also be represented. The organization must be large enough to coordinate Intelligence Community input to the policymakers and to insure quality representation at meetings here in Washington and at the negotiating sessions in Vienna or Geneva. However, it should be small enough so that the great majority of the analytic work would continue to be done by the individual intelligence agencies throughout the Community. This insures continued involvement by all elements of the Intelligence Community. I would estimate an initial strength of eight professionals would be sufficient, with the flexibility to grow if the workload increases. To reinforce further the perception that this is a Community organization, it should not be located at CIA Headquarters. Finally, and perhaps most important, the chief of the organization should report directly to the DCI and the NFIB through the DDCI.

5. The above thoughts are the product of my observation of the arms control process and some discussion with those who are involved in the process. There has been no attempt to circulate these views widely or to develop any consensus.


Larry D. Budge

cc: DDI